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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #3896-83
27 May 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : David D. Gries 
National Intelligence Officer for Narcotics

THROUGH : Chairman, National Intelligence Council

SUBJECT : 26 May Meeting of National Border Interdiction System
Coordinating Board

1. Admiral Murphy reported that he had visited three of the six regional Centers of the NBIS, and would visit the remaining three next week. He also introduced the staff that will support the coordinating board. (For our purposes, we should continue to work with Phil Hughes and Joan Nathanson.)

2. Customs will supply the chief of the New York NBIS Center and Coast Guard will supply the deputy chief. The same holds for Chicago and El Paso. In Miami, New York, and Long Beach, the situation is reversed, with Coast Guard supplying the chief and Customs the deputy. The chief is not a manager in the usual sense; Murphy said he should be thought of as the Vice President's coordinator on the scene. Charlie Rinkevitch, who set up the South Florida task force, is the prototype.

3. Inside each center there will be an operational information group, bringing together surface, air, and intelligence elements and having an intelligence coordinator. A chart of a typical operational information group lists under intelligence CIA, DEA, FBI, INR, DIA, and USCG. It is expected that these agencies will supply watch standers to monitor incoming intelligence on a 24-hour basis. (After the meeting, I determined that CIA was not expected to supply manpower to the Centers.)

4. Murphy described a lack of coordination between operational and intelligence elements as the heart of his problem. Good intelligence was lacking, and what little was available was not collated and provided to operational elements. Intelligence elements did not task operational elements to fill information gaps. As I was sliding lower in my chair, I was relieved to hear him say that he was not describing the kind of intelligence that CIA collected. The missing intelligence was tactical intelligence, and the

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missing collating function was an EPIC-type function. He compared this to the Sixth Fleet collecting tactical intelligence for analysis by shore-based military analysts and instant relay to fleet commanders for their use.

5. Five of the six NBIS centers will launch major air and sea surveillance exercises in June. Most of these involve the use of AWACS, E2B/C, helicopters and Coast Guard cutters. In the past such coordinated efforts have only been undertaken in South Florida.

6. It was recognized that the military lacked the resources to maintain full coverage in all regions. Ultimately, military resources would have to be dedicated to the NBIS; at the outset they would be borrowed.

7. Vice President Bush will make a public statement on 15 June describing NBIS developments.

8. Comment: It is obvious where Murphy is coming from. He needs tactical collectors, like DEA, Coast Guard, Army, Navy, Air and NSA, and he needs analysts who understand how to collate this tactical intelligence and forward it to law enforcement agencies for their use. Although this is easy enough for us to understand, it was not at all clear to some of the law enforcement community represented at the table.

9. This raises the question of what CIA can do to help without giving the appearance of participating in law enforcement activities. After the meeting, Murphy asked that we give serious thought to how we can contribute to the intelligence function of the six NBIS centers. I said that perhaps we could provide guidance and know-how, rather than personnel. He asked that we study it and get back.

10. What the Centers really need is a DDI-type overseas support unit, such as functioned in Saigon during the Vietnam War. Such a unit would receive all the take, analyze it, generate requirements, and report daily to operational units. But CIA cannot do this inside the US without giving the appearance of participating in law enforcement.

11. This said, is there any reason why we cannot train others on how to do the same thing? For example, two or three experienced DDI analysts could survey a Center and write a guidance document recommending how the Center should handle intelligence. The document should also establish formats for debriefing traffickers and for providing requirements to collectors like DEA, Coast Guard, Border Patrol, Army, Navy, Air, and the FBI. It could also draw up a format for a daily intelligence SITREP as well as an intelligence spot report. This survey could be prepared by TDY DDI/OGI analysts (if available) or OTE or DDI annuitants.

12. OCG should examine any proposal we make to the Vice President's Office. If you generally agree with the above comments, I will contact them and get a preliminary reading. We will need a broad paper trail confirming that provision of guidance and know-how to law enforcement agencies is permitted under our Executive Orders. Since the tactical intelligence to be analyzed is foreign intelligence (aircraft from Mexico, mother ships from Colombia), this should not be too difficult.

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13. The next meeting may be called on 6 June. With the exception of Admiral Murphy, Judge Webster, and Bud Mullin, others in attendance were assistant secretaries, deputy assistant secretaries, and office directors from the participating agencies.



David D. Gries

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